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Fear and Othering in Delhi: Assessing Non-Belonging of
Kashmiri Muslims

Charlote Thomas

This contribution aims at assessing to what
extent does the fact of living in New Delhi
infuence the Kashmiri Muslims’ sense of a
national belonging to India. Non-belongingness
is appraised through the study of Kashmiri
Muslims’ emotions and perceptions towards
New Delhi, that is to say the territory and
the inhabitants of the capital city of India.
Living in New Delhi nurtures an othering
process between Kashmiri Muslims and the
non-Kashmiri Muslim Delhite society. The
contribution analyses this process as a twoway dynamic wherein both the groups are at
stake. In the same vein, non-belongingness
also appears to be an ambiguous process.
But ultimately, the feeling of non-belonging
prevails among Kashmiri Muslims. Eventually,
Kashmiri Muslims’ feelings towards New Delhi
coalesced with their feelings regarding the
Indian state. Informed by the socialization
to state-led violence that they experienced
in Indian-Administrated Kashmir as well as

their actual experience of New Delhi, Kashmiri
Muslims convert their non-belongingness to the
city into a perception of national disafliation
towards what they name ‘India’. The study is
based on feldwork conducted in September
and October 2016 in New Delhi among twenty
Kashmiri Muslims who had lived in the capital
city of India from six months to ten years prior
to the interviews.
Keywords: non-belonging, emotions, Kashmiri Muslims, New
Delhi
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Introduction
In January 2016, I landed in New Delhi barely a few hours
after an attack on the Indian military camp of Pathankot,
in Indian-Administered Kashmir (IAK). IAK, nested inside
the 12.5 million inhabitant-strong state of Jammu-andKashmir (J&K), on the border with Pakistan, is the only
majority-Muslim Indian territory: 99% of its inhabitants
are estimated to be Muslim, most of them Sunni despite
an important Shia minority. In the wake of this event, the
casual conversations that I had with a Kashmiri friend of
mine, A., took a special turn. A., a Muslim who grew up in
IAK, travelled to the Indian capital at eighteen to pursue
his studies in one of India’s most prestigious universities.
He had been living in Delhi for five to six years at the time
of our conversation, during which time he had continued
to pay regular visits to his family in IAK. As I myself
studied India’s Muslim minority as a political scientist, we
frequently discussed both the general situation of Indian
Muslims and the specific case of Kashmiri Muslims (KMs).
In 2016, I asked A. what the local reaction to this attack
was, in the knowledge that, on the ground, the Indian state
could face a severe curtailment of civil liberties upon the
population for a potentially lengthy span of time in order
to stop the perpetrators of what authorities were calling
a ‘terrorist attack,’ and/or their accomplices. I asked
for specifics when A. told me that the population of IAK
accepted, and sometimes celebrated, actions that could
‘damage’ the Indian state, despite any grim consequences
they might face. With mixed emotion, anger, despair, and
sorrow, my friend eventually elaborated on the effects
on IAK’s population of two laws, the Jammu and Kashmir
Public Safety Act, 1978 (PSA) and the Armed Forces (Special
Powers) Act, 1990 (AFSPA), which allow arrests, detainment, and arbitrary prosecution, officially for the purpose
of “maintaining law and order” (Rabbani 2011; Duschinski
and Ghosh 2017: 319-321). Heavy military presence, disappearances, torture, rapes, harassment, censorship, and
curtailment of civil liberties constitute daily life for IAK’s
inhabitants (UNHCHR 2018).
Through scientific literature, I was fully aware of these
abuses, but this was the first time that I was hearing an
account from a ‘real person’ as to how this state of affairs
impacted Indian Kashmiris. Unsure of how to empathize
with my afflicted friend, I innocently suggested that
living outside IAK must provide him with an appreciated,
albeit temporary, relief. In New Delhi, neither PSA nor
AFSPA apply whilst the police presence can be deemed
democratically ‘acceptable’ and the army is not deployed.
As a friend, I was slightly bewildered by A.’s reply. To
him, “living in India,” as he called it–detaching IAK from

64 | HIMALAYA Fall 2020

the rest of the country–actually acts as an incubator for
rejection of the Indian state. My interest was triggered
by this apparent contradiction, since in Delhi, Kashmiris
are at least able to experience more of the Indian state’s
‘left hand,’ i.e. public services such as health and education, as opposed to only its ‘right hand,’ i.e. the state’s
diffraction into military and police institutions (Bourdieu
1993). Naively, I thought, this might have balanced the
perception of the state as a pure oppressor. As a political
scientist, I thus decided to return in 2016 to question the
dynamic depicted by my friend. By September, I was back
in New Delhi for two weeks1.
Underlying A.’s bitter remark was the question of
belonging to the national body that he epitomized as
India, a question which, as we shall see, has different
implications for Kashmiris, be they Muslim or Hindu–my
focus being on the former. Inspired by A.’s remark, the
research question that thus structures this contribution
could be enunciated as follows: to what extent does the
fact of living in New Delhi shape KMs’ sense of a national
belonging to India? An overview of the social science
literature about India shows that belonging or belongingness (two interchangeable terms) to the nation remains
poorly documented. Studies deal with identity dynamics
or politics rather than with belonging per se. These works
contribute to understanding belongingness, but belonging
only appears in the background of these studies, not at the
crux of them. Other scholars adopt a macro-sociological
angle to analyze the production of ‘Indianness’ in the colonial or postcolonial context (Merrill 2009; Blom Hansen
and Stepputat 2001). In the same macro-sociological vein,
Arjun Appadurai questions belongingness in the age of
globalization and in relation with the influx of (communal)
violence Appadurai (2009). Where they address a more
limited group, studies mostly deal with identity dynamics
of ethnic (Menon and Karthik 2019; Rycroft and Dasgupta
2011; Longkumer 2010) or gender groups (ThaparBjörkert 1996) sometimes by adopting an intersectional
approach (Kirmani 2013; Vijayalakshmi 2004). Outside
of India proper, the production of ‘Indianness’ has also
been documented in diasporic groups (Eisenlohr 2006;
Mankekar 2002). However, national belongingness of
religious-ethnic minorities such as Christians and Muslims
has barely been addressed: identity again overshadows
belonging. Academics, meanwhile, account for the inception of a secularist India, and what this means for the
Muslim minority as regards their ‘Muslimness’ (Sherman
2015; Hasan 2008b; Talbot 1995; or in relation with identity
politics (Blom Hansen 2000). Muslimness itself is seldom
thought of in relation to the ethnic ‘Other,’ except in few
micro-localized ethnographic accounts (Thomas 2018;

Kirmani 2008), being more commonly explored reflexively, inside the minority itself (Jairath 2011; Alam 2008;
Hasan 2008a; Engineer 2008), in works which aptly deconstruct the pre-notion of a homogenous Muslim ‘community’
but remain tight-lipped on the national belongingness of
Muslims.
A specific review of scholarship relating to Indian
Kashmiris2 reveals the same deficit in terms of belongingness. The most striking aspect of this literature is
its two opposing tendencies: in one, Kashmir is mainly
approached as a “disputed territory” (Zutshi 2012: 1034).
Framed in terms of International Relations, contributions
pay scarce attention to IAK inhabitants beyond their
instrumental importance in maintaining the so-called
safety of India. The identity or belonging of Kashmiris are
not delved into. These studies are thus of little interest
in accurately documenting the local dynamics prevailing
in IAK. The second tendency, although scant, is of no
small interest, and since 2000 has obviously undergone
a renewal in Indian Kashmiri scholarship (Behera 2000).
Authors in this current, who do explore the identity maze
of Kashmiris, rely on anthropology or sociology, and base
their studies on more consistent fieldwork. Questions of
national belongingness are again approached through the
question of identity or ethnicity, itself explored in two
main directions: one is the notion of Kashmiriyat, the other
the role of violence. Studies on Kashmiriyat, that is, the
“sense of Kashmiriness,” (Ellis and Khan 2003: 524) mainly
appear in works dedicated to Pandits (KPs), i.e. Hindu
Kashmiris. KPs present themselves as the torchbearers of
Kashmiriyat, depicting it as the Hindu-Muslim syncretic
identity of a romanticized pristine Kashmir, dealt fatal
blows by the insurgency and forced migrations of the
1990s. In fact, KP’s identity has always been tied to their
migration (Bhat 2012; Datta 2016) and related to their
remote “homeland”, IAK (Evans 2002; Duschinski 2008).
KMs and KPs are never considered together, however. This
state of Kashmiri scholarship is telling about the two’s
conflicting political aspirations for IAK, and the antagonistic identities both groups attribute to it. With a view
to providing consistent perspectives as to what national
belongingness to India embodies, KM and KP could not
be interviewed in the frame of the same study3. When it
comes specifically to the notion of Kashmiriyat, contributions are mainly theoretical (Punjabi 2018; Ellis and Khan
2003), and are seldom confronted to the various uses of
Kashmiriyat on the ground. Moreover, several studies are
policy-oriented, a perspective that distances them from
purely scholarly research (Evans 2002). I therefore follow
Aggarwal in considering Kashmiriyat to be “an empty signifier” (Aggarwal 2008).

Violence is the second area in which Kashmiris’ identity is
directly or indirectly explored. Scholars have documented
the combined effects of security laws on the KM, as well as
daily life under the insurgency, adopting different angles:
the judicial perspective (Cottrell 2013; Duschinski and
Ghosh 2017); that of political mobilizations (Robinson 2013;
Duschinski et al. 2018); and the examination of their social
impacts on the Kashmiri population (Dabla 2011; Malik
2019). Historians’ accounts are also of importance as they
give long-term depth to contemporary dynamics (Snedden
2013; Zutshi 2004). This renewed scholarship is of great
interest: in documenting identity, it eventually touches
upon belongingness. Two shortcomings can nonetheless
be noted. Firstly, belonging is never addressed as such,
theory- or methodology-wise. One study did attempt
to do so, but its theorization of belonging, as well as its
articulation with fieldwork could be strengthened (Bouzas
2016). Related to the first shortcoming, identity is always
documented in a positive way–namely “who I am” – but
never negatively–“who I am not”. Secondly, contrary
to the IR approach, the works cited above isolate KMs
by disconnecting them from the broader national and
territorial body they legally belong to (Behera 2000: 11-18).
KMs and Indians, for instance, are seldomly put in relation.
As such, scholars pay less attention to the interactionist
dynamic that actually frames identity and (non-)belonging
alike. KMs seem merely to be reacting to the power that
is exerted on them4, and their agency capabilities are less
visible. Documenting national belongingness by and of
itself therefore appears of crucial importance.
A. The conceptual frame: othering, as a result of emotions and
perceptions
In the wider social sciences, meanwhile, belongingness is
a thoroughly explored topic. As Tuuli Lähdesmäki et al.
(2016) indicated while stimulatingly assessing its use in
contemporary research, belonging has tended to replace
identity in a growing number of studies. The authors
follow Elspeth Probyn (1996) in considering belonging to
be a more relevant tool than identity when it comes to
grasping dynamics of affiliation. To them, identity posits
a rigid, unidimensional, and linear process, whereas “the
strength of belonging as an academic concept lies exactly
in its flexibility and adaptability” (Lähdesmäki et al. 2016:
242), a statement from which I distance myself. Rather,
I consider identity to be a notion that could be used as
smoothly as belonging is (Martin 2010). Belongingness
is simply the name of another process. The two can be
distinguished in a nearly tautological fashion: identity
addresses the process of identification, while belonging
addresses the process of belonging. ‘Being’ and ‘being part
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of’ relate to two intertwined yet different dynamics: ‘being’
versus ‘feeling’. Probyn, followed by Bell, has highlighted
the dimension of longing inherent in the former (Probyn
quoted in Bell 1999: 1).
1. (Non-)belonging, music à Quatre Mains
Since I intend to evaluate how Indian, or not, KMs feel–
that is, their ‘national affiliation,’–I framed my fieldwork
with the concept of belonging. While I disagree when
Lähdesmäki et al. oppose belonging to identity, I otherwise
follow them when they stress its epistemological merits.
Belongingness offers separate yet linked perspectives:
synchronic and diachronic; static and dynamic; individual
and collective Lähdesmäki et al. (2016: 242). Affiliation is
understood as a shifting and multi-layered, sometimes
antagonistic but always complex, web of belongingness.
Lähdesmäki et al. then identify five intertwined topics
wherein belongness is mainly discussed, one of them being
non-belonging (ibid: 236). After my conversation with A., I
hypothesized that living in New Delhi nurtures a sense of
non-belonging to India. I therefore focused on the production of dynamics of non-belonging among Muslim citizens
from IAK who live in New Delhi. Interestingly, unlike in
many studies, non-belonging here concerns a national
group (as defined by law) in a social and spatial context in
which the policies informants experience are objectively
less discriminatory than those in their home state. Despite
my analytical focus being non-belonging, I begin from a
definition of its reverse: belonging. ‘Non’ here has no negative connotation, it simply expresses the opposite feeling
to belonging.
For a definition, I refer to Lähdesmäki et al., who offer one
encompassing both theoretical and methodological tools
to assess (non-)belongingness: “[belonging] comprises
of situational relationships with other people and social
and cultural practices stemming from these relationships,
which are fundamentally political and include emotional
and/or affective orientations” Lähdesmäki et al. (ibid:
242). The “political” dimensions of “relationships” and
“emotions” are three methodological components of
specific interest for this study, since I intend to show
that relationships and emotions inform national (hence
political) disaffiliation. Dynamics of non-belonging can
be observed through the reconstitution of the “othering”
process, that is to say practices and narratives that
separate “those who are ‘not us’, and who in not being
us, endanger what is ours” Ahmed (2004: 1). Like (non-)
belonging, othering is a tango that cannot be danced
alone: KMs faced it whilst living in New Delhi, while being
actively engaged in it themselves.
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2. Emotions and the city
Following the call of Lähdesmäki et al. for a context-specified use of belonging, I combined the first definition with
one that emphasizes the role played by emotions (Ahmed
2004; Fortier 2000; Bell 1999). Belonging is thus defined
as an “emotional attachment, about feeling ‘at home’ and
(…) about feeling ‘safe’” (Yuval-Davis 2006: 197)5. “Feeling
at home [and] safe” (ibid) is at the core of my examination to assess non-belonging and the way informants feel
otherized in New Delhi, it being established that a ‘city’
alludes to a physical and a sociological component, i.e. a
territory and its inhabitants. My raw material to substantiate the othering process are informants’ emotions and
perceptions: how they feel and how perceive the city and
its inhabitants, as well as, in a reversed manner, how they
think that they are perceived by New Delhi’ inhabitants.
Nonetheless, practices of the city per se are not thoroughly
explored. Rather, the city acts as the frame of dynamics of
non-belonging to New Delhi, and, beyond it, to India, as I
will show later.
Emotions refer to affective feelings towards a situation,
while perceptions are cognitive representations stemming
from physical senses. Both are cognitive interpretations
and sensorial codifications of reality, the methodological
use of which in qualitative research is less devaluated
than it once was (Ahmed 2004: 3), and their socially- and
spatially-informed nature is now acknowledged enough
for emotions and perceptions to be deemed telling of social
reality (Flam and Kleres 2015: 2; Weber 2009: 207-209).
Both affect informants’ agency capabilities and evidence
the relational dimension of social facts, inasmuch as
informants’ thoughts, emotions and perceptions are all
equally shaped by socialization. This contribution therefore
analyzes KMs’ perceptions of and emotions towards the city
as indicative of the othering process through which non-belonging is revealed. It is important to note that ‘belonging’
to India was not put in balance with belongingness to IAK or
to Pakistan. Despite Pakistani interferences in the insurgency (through ideological and logistical support to armed
groups), the core question of the study was the perception
of the national frame KMs are legally a part of.
B. Investigating the KMs of Delhi
In terms of fieldwork, the choice of New Delhi was firstly
driven by the fact that I knew people there who could
help to make this study feasible, especially in the charged
context during which it took place. This concrete aspect
notwithstanding, Delhi was not a default option: the city is
inhabited by people from different parts of India who settle
there to earn their living, and as such offers a restricted yet

somehow representative glimpse of ‘India.’ Also, being the
political capital of the country, Delhi epitomizes the power
of the central government, a crucial component of the
KMs’ perception of ‘India.’ Over two weeks of fieldwork, I
interviewed fourteen men and six women, all KMs settled
in Delhi, aged nineteen to forty at the time of interview.
All were met through the ‘snow-ball effect’ that started
from two personal acquaintances who were both from IAK
but did not know each other (and still do not). One was A.,
the male friend whom I referred to above, and the other
was B., a female journalist. Their professional backgrounds
explain why informants with highly qualified educational
or professional occupations are over-represented in my
sample despite my tries to broaden its scope. Because of
the socio-economic profile of informants, this contribution thus accounts from, and for, a specific perspective.
Informants were pursuing their studies at university, from
Bachelor level to PhD degrees, or worked in intellectual
professions. The youngest informants had been settled
in New Delhi for six months, while the oldest had been
living there for up to ten years. All came for a professional or educational purpose. New Delhi was one option
among others in India and this destination was chosen
for the opportunities it offered. For all, staying in J&K
was not possible because of a lack of opportunities there.
Meanwhile, going abroad was deemed impossible because
of the cost to bear. Informants all had regular physical or
phone contacts with their family. Interviews were unstructured and unrecorded. Except for one, interviews never
took place at informants’ homes but in public places. All
were undertaken in New Delhi, none in Old Delhi. Names
have been changed, and age at the time of interview is
indicated in brackets, as is occupation. Locations remain
purposely vague in order to preserve informants’ safety.
Ultimately, I demonstrate that the (micro) ‘Delhi experience,’ namely the combination of KMs’ perceptions and
emotions towards the city and its society, coalesces into a
(macro) national disaffiliation. For this purpose, fieldwork
is firstly contextualized (1). I then show that othering
arises from informants’ relation to the urban territory of
New Delhi (2) and its inhabitants (3). In these two sections
we will see how informants expressed the “unsafety” that
they felt regarding New Delhi. Hence, we will analyze the
othering process that they undergo. Regarding our definition of belonging, we shall see that othering eventually
nurtures a sense of non-belonging to the Indian state (4).
Long-run paterns of a confictual relationship
This first section aims at defining KMs’ relationship to the
Indian state at the time of their moving outside IAK. Being

part of the Indian nation has been a long-standing question for the Kashmiri people, even before Independence
(Rai 2004; Zutshi 2004). Partition in 1947 marked the beginning of a protracted twofold war for the inhabitants of J&K:
the one inside their territory, regarding which political
option they would choose6 (Varshney 1991; Tremblay 19961997); the other about their territory, between Pakistan
and India, both aiming to integrate the whole of Kashmir,
or at least what they deemed to be their share, into their
respective nations (Schofield 2003; Ganguly 2016). Due to
the turbulent process that eventually led to the accession
of J&K to the Indian Union7 as well as the proximity of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the latter’s interferences
in the insurgency, the national affiliation of Kashmiris to
the national body of India has always been scrutinized.
In 1953, providing Kashmiris with acknowledgment of
their specific rights was the raison d’être of Article 370 of
the Indian Constitution in order to nurture the sense of
belonging to the Indian Union (Chandra Pal 1953). Despite
these legal arrangements, “in reality Kashmir never effectively enjoyed anything like the autonomy that Article 370
seemed to promise” (Cottrell 2013: 166) irrespective of the
political affiliation of the central or local government.
A. Socialization to violence
PSA and AFSPA resulted in a disregard for the legal rights
of J&K’s people (Mathur 2013). Fearing secessionism,
the central government along with mainstream local
political parties like the National Conference (NC) and
the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) continuously eroded
J&K’s autonomy8. 1987 was a turning point in that respect,
with rigged elections propelling the armed insurgency
that started two years later (Chowdhary 2016: 28). On the
ground, the episode led to Kashmiris engaging in largescale political violence (militancy and stone-pelting)9, and
IAK soon became one of the world’s most militarized zones,
controlled by 500,000 soldiers and 100,000 intelligence officers (Rabbani 2011: 260-261). Civilians, caught between
insurgents and security forces, were the first victims of
the conflict. Since 1990, over 70,000 civilians and militants
have been killed by armed groups or state armed forces,
and more than 8,000 others have disappeared (JKCCS 2016).
Violence aside, social life in public spaces has also been
dramatically reduced: Kashmiri society’s daily routine
revolves around the conflict (Hassan 2018) giving rise to a
situation that can be evaluated as “the fall of democracy in
Jammu and Kashmir” (Widmalm 1997, title of the article).
PSA and AFSPA allow for authoritarian and arbitrary power:
authoritarian because contesting is barely allowed; arbitrary because of the indiscriminate use of force on civilians
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(Mathur 2016). Contesting Delhi’s rule over IAK is considered a threat to national security. Official state narratives
reduce opponents to ‘terrorists’ whenever they use violence
(be it armed violence or not, like stone-pelting), while
political demands for self-determination or for the proper
administration of Art. 370 are disqualified as ‘anti-national’
demands emanating from ‘Pakistan’s puppets.’ For this
reason, intelligence agents put Kashmiris under constant
surveillance, giving birth to what can be called a system of
general institutionalized suspicion wherein Kashmiris live
under continuous oppression. In terms of belonging, those
contemporary developments had intertwined effects, each
cultivating the other. Firstly, under the combined effects
of the militancy and, more importantly, of the State armed
forces, Kashmiri society has been socialized to violence
since 199010. Violence is now so entrenched in daily life
that it is part of IAK ‘normality’ (Devadas 2018; Dabla 2011).
Crucially, relationships to the state have been gradually
reduced to physically or symbolically violent encounters
with armed forces. Secondly though, as the renewed scholarship mentioned above shows, KMs are nowadays more
likely to encounter the right hand of the State than its left.
Every KM I interviewed had a story to tell about personal
interactions with this right hand. Beyond their own experiences, each one knew someone who had been killed by
the army. Tales about the conflict are the common narrative of KMs. Abadeen (twenty-eight, journalist)11, whom
I met at her office’s coffee house, settled in New Delhi in
2013. While evoking her childhood, her face marked by
sadness, she said in a stony voice:
I remember the green color of the [military] shoes,
the helicopters above my head, the five to ten people in army fatigues all the time. My father used to
read the newspaper every day to check if he knew
names of dead people. I don’t know what freedom is.
Childhood memories also featured in Hifza’s (twenty-one,
student) interview. Also a Bachelor student, she gave me
an appointment on university grounds. Unlike Abadeen’s,
her narration was fast and rushed. Her eyes gazed at me,
bold and upset. She recalled her early years as tainted by
“harassment from army and militants”. When she detailed
what she perceived as her “denied normal childhood,”
both anger and sorrow transpired:
I knew guns. I knew cousins who were shot at. I
knew bloodshed. I know that at 7pm we shut off the
lights because of army or militancy and we didn’t
want them to know we were there. This is what I
knew. Violence came to our psyche as a child. This
shapes you.
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Born out this violent childhood, “fear” is the main emotion
referred to when describing relations with the state.
Abadeen became angry when she expressed “the fear [the
Army] puts in” [her], “the fear the uniform puts in [her]”.
Beyond this, fear breeds “a dormant anger” that permanently lies inside her. Abadeen’s and Hifza’s memories sum
up the emotions of my informants: fear and anger were
shared by all.
B. Vis-a-vis the state: fear then anger
Michel Foucault’s relational theorization of power can
be called upon to conceptualize the consequences of this
state of affairs in terms of national belonging. According
to Foucault, power relations between the State and the
people are not antagonistic but agonistic, that is to say they
are based on “a relationship which is both of reciprocal
incitement and of struggle, (...) a permanent provocation”
Foucault (1994: 238). Along the agonistic scale, the relationship varies from peaceful to conflictual according to
reciprocal interactions. Coupled with his methodological
approach of power, Foucault considers that “events”12 are
crucial moments that render a given long-term process
more blatant. For Kashmir, we can hence assume that
the state’s actions in 1947-1948, 1953-1955, and 19871990 were decisive episodes in the long run, negatively
impacting KMs’ sense of belonging to the Indian state.
More recently, episodes such as the Gawarkadal Massacre
of 1990, the Kunan Poshpora collective rape of 1991, as
well as severe repression in 2008 and 2010, were also
detrimental. Gradually, the conflictual aspect of the
agonistic relationship seems to have become widespread
and predominant within KM society, the state’s actions
reciprocally nurturing KM anger. As for KMs themselves,
this does not prevent “lull periods”13 between episodes
of repression, but the overall conflictual dimension has
increased, especially among young people born from
around 1990. Hifza’s opinion was telling in that respect:
“That’s why we can’t feel for this country. This country
can’t do anything about the damages that have been
done [to the Kashmiri population]”. The 2014 election of
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) at the central level, with
Narendra Modi as Prime Minister, and of a PDP-BJP ruling
coalition in J&K, has added an ethnic component to the
longstanding hostility. Modi is considered a staunch Hindu
nationalist with a strong anti-Muslim stance (Vanaik
2017). Framed in the current context, suspicion against
KMs can therefore be compared, while not fully equated
with, the discrimination that Indian Muslims face. For
the latter, suspicion and discrimination have not been
translated into a body of law.

Legal aliens in New Delhi
Analyzing the emotions and perceptions of the physical territory of New Delhi is the first way to render the
othering process visible, along with the active role played
by the “others” themselves, i.e. the KM, in that process. We
start by very briefly contextualizing the fieldwork in order
to better embed the informants in contemporary social
and political dynamics. Then the territorial experience of
New Delhi is examined.
A. The events of 2016
The repression that took place in summer 2016 was a
Foucaldian event: it was in the complex context described
above that a massive repression took place in IAK in the
summer of 2016. 135 civilians were killed (alongside 145
militants and 100 members of the armed forces) and 15,000
more were injured, mostly following soldiers’ misuse of
so-called “non-lethal” pellet guns, with 1,178 civilians
receiving pellets in the eyes (JKCCS 2016: 4, 8). The configuration of the protests (Rai and Dutta 2017; Mehta 2016)
shows that the state’s polymorphic14 repression in 2016
nurtured the conflictual relationship between Kashmiris
and the state. Beside qualitative inputs, quantitative data
shows a massive recruitment increase in militancy against
the Indian state since the BJP’s election in 2014 and even
more since 2016 (Bhatt 2017). Regarding non-armed
violence, 2016 was the first time that men and women
from the upper-middle class joined the demonstrators as
massively as they did, some even became stone-pelters
(Rai and Dutta 2017). Outside IAK, the mainstream narrative about the demonstrations there took a usual turn:
economic (“‘rioters’ are unemployed”) and religious
(“‘rioters’ are Muslims, hence against India”) claims were
used to negate the political dimension of mobilizations
(Naqash 2018). Living in New Delhi, informants were thus
constantly immerged in this narrative and had to face it.
Between my two journeys in India in 2016, the context
had therefore become dramatically tenser, as had the
relation between KMs and the Indian state15. As a matter
of fact, interviews systematically started with informants
mentioning the on-going repression.
B. The ambivalent insecurity of Delhi
2016 did not radically change the informants’ perceptions
of and emotions about the long-run process at stake, but
we can assume that it might have vivified them. “Fear”
was the main word chosen by informants to depict their
feelings towards New Delhi. Drawn from this emotion, an
acute sense of insecurity pervaded informants’ accounts
of their daily lives in New Delhi. This perception bolsters

the othering process KMs undergo, by strengthening their
feeling of being different. Questioned on which place they
consider to be the safest, KMs deemed that “threats are
different,” as Saajid and his friends, Baasha, Irfan, and
Maazin, put it. Like him, they were twenty-six-year-old
PhD students who had settled in New Delhi a few years
beforehand. Two were housed in the university’s hostels;
two others were renting a shared-flat in a Muslim area.
The four PhD students most vehemently claimed their
anger and rejection of the Indian state.
Other accounts elaborated on these different threats,
as they are perceived by KMs. I met Ifrah (twenty-six,
student) at the university where she was preparing her
MPhil. She had been in IAK from May to August. For her:
“It is safer here, but I can hardly express my point of
view”. Asif, thirty-nine, was a photographer working for
a newspaper, whom I met at his office. He was calm even
when recounting the numerous harsh verbal attacks he
suffered as a KM. Asif did indeed have identifiable features,
such as a beard and a prayer bump on forehead (zebibah;
Arabic), and his visual work identified him as a KM.
Paradoxical as it may sound, his account was marked by a
vibrant yet cold emotion–a state somehow close to resignation. He said: “It is very different here and there. There
you have to manage the security and the army but here
Kashmiris can never express their mind”. Abdul (nineteen,
student) had settled in New Delhi a few months prior to
the interview, studying at the same university as Saajid
and his friends. Both interviews took place in roughly the
same conditions. Abdul was with two other friends when
we talked. He balanced the physical security of New Delhi
with the curtailment of free speech that he felt here. He
expressed it in a bitter way: “Of course it’s safer here. If
you don’t contradict, if you comply, it’s ok. So, actually you
are not free when you cannot say what you want. There,
you can shout ‘azadi’ (Urdu; freedom), your only risk is to
be killed! [laughs]”. An exchange between Irfan and Saajid
(both twenty-six, PhD students) summarized informants’
feelings about Kashmir: “The danger to be killed doesn’t
impede the fact that this is home”, said Irfan. “Yes”, Saajid
continued, “the idea of home is not diluted despite fear [he
smiled]. In fact, idea of home gets strengthened by all of
that”. By contrast, New Delhi seemed more repellant for
KMs. Fear and the sense of security are the two feelings
at the core of the definition of belonging that I retained.
We can see that informants weighted, and expressed,
the two fears differently: the fear engendered by Indian
security forces in IAK was less harshly felt than the fear
generated by inhabiting a non-Kashmiri milieu, the latter
vanishing before the sense of security provided by the
ethnic entre-soi (French; homogeneity) of IAK. The words
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of Faida (thirty-nine, communications officer) mirrored
those of several other informants. She lived in posh area
of New Delhi and we met in classy café. She was upset, but
she smiled when she summarized: “I feel more secure in
Kashmir, without any hesitation! That’s my home”.
Some accounts involuntarily expressed an ambivalent
relation to New Delhi16. Strict rejection was balanced by a
willingness to, in a way, rely on the (formally) democratic
rule of law prevailing in New Delhi, and the ability to
refer to law was the main positive aspect that informants
mentioned. Compared to the two friends he was with, Saab
(eighteen, student) was more talkative and vocal about
his feelings. A Bachelor student, Saab had settled in New
Delhi a few months earlier, as had his two companions.
They were housed in the university’s hostels. Saab said:
“Outside Kashmir, a Kashmiri doesn’t endure AFSPA. He
cannot be killed or disappeared without any reason”. In
the same vein, Wahid (twenty-six, PhD student) considered
that leaving Kashmir meant becoming a citizen with full
rights. Enrolled in a different university, when I met him
at a coffee house Wahid was depressed by the on-going
repression. Despite his despair regarding the situation in
IAK, his words displayed a level of trust in Indian institutions or at least, the willingness to trust in them: “Here
we have rights and the state has responsibilities towards
me, not as a Kashmiri, but as a student”. In a close, but
slightly different way, Baasha and Saajid (both twenty-six,
PhD students) expressed what, according to the agonistic
approach of power, I framed in terms of “strategical use”
of the state resources such as educational institutions. For
instance, Saajid declared: “We don’t expect freedom from
these institutions. We know how they work. We take only
our advantage from them”. To a very low extent, the will
to use state’s resources contrasts with the strict rejection
as worded by informants.
C. (Self-)restriction
Fear of New Delhi is based on concrete acts of rejection
against KMs. First and foremost, KM students living in
India suffered physical assaults (Kumar 2017), and harassment increased in the tense context of 2016. Several
informants recalled the case of a Kashmiri student of
Aligarh Muslim University who was expelled for publishing
what was deemed an ‘antinational’ post on Facebook
(Saaliq and Stevens 2016; Press Trust of India 2016a).
Saadia (twenty-three) was a Master’s student, whom I
met through Gafar (twenty-eight) her teacher. We talked
in her university’s canteen. She linked her apprehension
to a similar event: “My fear is increasing because of the
house of Kashmiri students that was recently raided [in
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New Delhi]”17. Faida (thirty-nine, communications officer)
linked her fear to the lack of critical thinking of non-KMs,
which impacts her freedom of movement: “Here people
don’t think. If someone starts chasing you, everyone will
do the same. [In Kashmir] you know who your enemies
are whereas here you don’t know”. The same was true for
Maazin (twenty-six, PhD student) who said, while we were
sitting at a tea stall, “Here you don’t have to face shootings
and you don’t have to show your I.D. all the time, but you
never know when an Indian wants to kick you out”.
Self-restriction from New Delhi’s public space did not
solely arouse from interactions outside IAK. On the
contrary, a “psychosis of fear”, as Abdul (nineteen,
student) called his perception of moving about the city,
results from the aggregation of two geographically
separated experiences: informants’ perceptions of New
Delhi on the one hand, and their past socialization in IAK
on the other, the latter influencing the former. Accounts
of primo-residents (KMs who had settled recently in New
Delhi) do indeed shed light on the dynamics of exclusion,
and the performative role of perceptions, hence of (non-)
belonging. Concrete events and fear coalesced to inform
KM mobility patterns in New Delhi. It was for instance
striking to note that all informants reported increased
fear on two specific dates: 26 January, Republic Day, and
15 August, Independence Day, on which KMs refrain from
moving within New Delhi. Abdul (nineteen, student) told:
“On the 15th [of August 2016] we were afraid, we thought
we would be arrested by the police and sent to jail”. When
asked why, Abdul, Parviz and Saab were surprised. After
a short pause, Abdul answered: “Because in Kashmir, on
every 15th of August we endure curfews, arrests, people are
killed. This is our experience of 15th of August”.
Despite the lack of the restrictions on mobilizations that
prevail in IAK, informants also chose to engage neither
in political mobilizations nor in associations specifically
aimed at advocating for KM claims: protesting outside
IAK is deemed “dangerous” by informants. Asif (thirty-nine, photographer) made a reference to a past protest:
“Members of RSS [Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh] and BJP
physically assaulted us, and the police didn’t do anything”.
Instead of organizing by themselves, Kashmiris therefore develop alternative strategies. Maazin (twenty-six,
PhD student) explained: “We join leftist organizations,
we don’t organize anything on our name”. Generally
speaking, informants referred to their “fear” of moving
“outside” their neighborhood or their campus. But, here
again, ambivalences appeared. Three women who on the
one hand discussed the fear of going “outside” nevertheless identified their campus as a place where, in terms

of clothing, make-up, and relationships with men, they
enjoyed a greater freedom than in IAK. On the other hand,
informants described higher overall fear in roaming widely
through New Delhi than in their own neighborhoods or
universities, which they deemed “safe”. Although fear and
insecurity mostly prevailed in determining KMs’ experience of New Delhi, a close examination of their accounts
therefore tells a slightly more balanced story. Ultimately
though, the sense of insecurity nurtures KMs’ feeling of
being different which, in turn, fuels their non-belongingness to New Delhi.
A reciprocal lack of trust
The social component of the Delhi experience will now be
examined in order to assess the interpersonal dimension
of the othering process, and of (non-)belonging. If ‘insecurity’ characterized the physical experience of New Delhi,
its social experience was worded in terms of the untrustworthiness of its people–hereafter the ‘non-KM Delhite
society’. We shall see that stigmatization from non-KM
Delhite society, and how informants perceived it, leads to
the social marginalization of KMs. But, their role is also
active, albeit sometimes unconsciously, in this dynamic.
A. The perception of disloyalty
The events of 2016 reactivated more or less dormant
stereotypes about KMs, the same that lead to mobs sometimes attacking students from IAK. Stereotypes evolved
around the supposed ‘disloyalty’ of KMs, as they themselves qualified it while discussing Delhites’ perception
of them. On-going repression at the time of interviews
further crystallized already polarized opinions. Lack of
compassion for civilians being killed by security forces was
omnipresent in the discussions I had. Faida’s (thirty-nine,
communications officer) conversations with her colleagues
are telling in that regard:
[My colleagues] refuse to understand what is going
on. Until July [2016], it was more or less ok, but
since then on things have dramatically evolved.
They think that I am a traitor. Last day, one of
my colleagues said: “Let me introduce you to the
separatist” before adding, “but why don’t you leave
Kashmir to settle in a friend country?” He was
referring to Pakistan. Now some of my colleagues
don’t even say “hello!”
Madhat (forty-four, journalist) settled in New Delhi in
the early 2010s. His face marred by anxiety, his sentences
were sharp as knives and punctuated by the numerous
cigarettes he smoked over our meeting at a coffee shop.

He bitterly considered that “the gap is also with the Indian
society [not only the state]”. A generation younger, Parviz
(eighteen, student) thought that: “In India, people are
brainwashed about Kashmir” whereas Abdul (nineteen,
student), a new settler, had already assimilated the stigmata of suspicion: “Indians don’t trust us”.
Disloyalty is perceived as the most common stereotype
projected onto KMs and the main bias that restrains
interactions with non-KM Delhite society. While this
perception mainly informed KM’s social interaction
patterns, as we will see, it has to be confronted with more
nuanced experiences–even for those informants quoted
here. Two students and one journalist considered that
they had the chance to freely debate about IAK with their
colleagues, while stressing that this uncommon freedom of
speech should be related to the “open-minded” or “leftist”
social milieu that prevails in their respective institutions.
Moreover, past socialization to violence also informs
informants’ perceptions of non-KM Delhite society as
Parviz (eighteen, student) blatantly, but unconscientiously,
expressed it when he mentioned his impossibility of freely
expressing his mind because of his “fear to be tortured”:
torture here is a clear reference to IAK, where the Indian
army uses it as a strategy to curb insurgency. For Parviz
and the others, perception of disloyalty triggered a
common feeling of frustration linked to a mixed emotion
of anger and fear as to the impossibility, both real and
perceived, of interacting with non-KMs.
B. (Self-)exclusion
The social dimension of the othering process will now be
examined, and through it how the relations with non-KM
Delhite society participate in the non-belongingness
of KMs, as patterns of social interactions with non-KM
Delhite society are driven by concrete facts of exclusion.
These generate, then substantiate, informants’ resolve
to voluntarily refrain from contact. The discrimination
that KMs face from landlords in New Delhi can be cited
as an example: suspicions of disloyalty prompt many
landlords to refuse to rent their properties to KMs. Almost
every informant told me of their difficulty in finding a
place to rent. Asif’s (thirty-nine, photographer) story is
emblematic in this regard. When he arrived in New Delhi
in 2012, he struggled to find an apartment: “Landlords
kept telling me ‘we don’t want to have problem,’ because I
was from Kashmir. I had to live in a hotel for two months
with my wife”. Although younger and of a different
gender, Hifza (twenty-one, student) had a similar story.
She was looking for a flat in 2014. Everything went well,
until Hifza’s father showed his identity documents to fill
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out the renting papers. At that point, the landlord’s wife
said: “Oh you are from Srinagar? Ok, so I’ll have to check
with my husband. I call you back tonight”. The call never
came. Despite this rejection, and based on the fieldwork I
conducted18, difficulties in finding rental accommodations
did not seem to generate ethnic enclaves. Apart for those
staying on campus, informants would rather merge into
broader Muslim clusters, such as Jamia Nagar, in order
to stay “undercover”. Two chose to dwell in ethnically
mixed localities. Without contradicting it, this nuances
the general segregation as perceived by KM: while the
majority did, some members of non-KM Delhite society
did not exclude KM. However, the general perception
of being ‘different’ from non-KM Delhite society, be it
Muslim or not, massively dominates the experients of the
participants.
Repeated, unpleasant experiences pushed informants to
opt for a strategy of avoidance. Abadeen (twenty-eight,
journalist) decided to drastically minimize interactions
after a traumatic interaction that she recounted with
sadness and anger:
In 2008, when I arrived, I was answerable on many
questions about Kashmir. One day, during a conference, someone gave me his visiting card while
asking where I was from in India. When I answered
“Kashmir,” he took his card back and told me, “I
don’t want to have any kind of relation with a terrorist”. I started crying amid everyone. From that
time on, I decided not to speak ever again about
Kashmir. People here, they judge without knowing
anything. They hear you, but they do not listen to
you. They don’t empathize for us.
Ultimately, lack of empathy nurtures frustration and then
withdrawal for many KM. Irfan (twenty-six, PhD student)
explained: “I have no Indian friends because they negate
what is going on [in Kashmir]”.
Avoiding interactions consequently provides a sense
of relief to informants but meanwhile widens the gap
between them and non-KM Delhite society. Informants
mostly characterized their social experience of New Delhi
in terms of fear, insecurity, rejection, and angry frustration. Put simply, KMs do not feel at home in New Delhi. We
shall see now, to conclude, how this non-belonging to a city
is converted into national disaffiliation towards the state.
From localized interactions to national disafliation
Living outside IAK did not soften the perception of the
Indian state. On the contrary, the othering dynamic that
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was born out of informants’ Delhi experience encouraged
their national disaffiliation. Before I myself theorize the
two in terms of non-belonging on the one hand, and
national disaffiliation on the other, the bridge between
New Delhi (hence non-belonging) and India (hence
national disaffiliation) was made naturally by informants.
All of them were met only once and as above-mentioned,
interviews were unstructured. It is hence telling that informants themselves systematically linked feelings towards
New Delhi to their personal belief of not-being Indian. It is
in that respect that the New Delhi experience is considered
to be an incubator of national disaffiliation for the people
who were interviewed in 2016. We shall now see that in
New Delhi, the violation of constitutional rights appears
even more blatantly. Ultimately, this state of affairs
deepens the conflictual aspect of the relationship between
the state and its Muslim citizens from IAK.
A. Devolution of rights in perspective
Dwelling in New Delhi put the lack of liberties and the
“abnormal,” as they put it, life that informants endured
in IAK into perspective. Wahid (twenty-six, PhD student)
related: “Even though I am in Delhi and I get some rights
as an Indian citizen, I lose all of them once I enter Kashmir.
There is a complete violation of human rights there”.
When Ifrah (twenty-six, PhD student) arrived in New Delhi
she was indeed struck by the functioning of state institutions: “State functions very differently here. Kashmir is a
military camp”. For Abdul (nineteen, student), living in a
more politically open context is a Copernican revolution:
“This is the first time I came in contact with India. There
is indeed a contradiction with what I believed in the
past: before I only saw their guns, their tanks. Here it’s
different”. Hifza (twenty-one, student) discovered what it
is to live in a non-military context: “It’s only when I came
here that I realize what a normal life is: no identity checks,
no guns”.
Untold (because unperceived as such) ambivalence
remained at the background of several accounts. For some,
New Delhi could sound like a shelter protecting informants
from violence (be it from the state or militants). Although
they were disillusioned, this very idea in itself shows
an ambivalent relationship to New Delhi. For instance,
Abadeen (twenty-eight, journalist) initially thought that
leaving IAK would help her to move away from violence;
she now realized that: “Even if you leave Kashmir, Kashmir
doesn’t leave you”. Wahid (twenty-six, PhD student) told of
a similar ambivalence, albeit with a different dynamic. To
him, the situations in Delhi and in IAK contrast too harshly
to be bearable. He therefore limited his visits to IAK, and

favored staying in New Delhi. But, beyond ambivalences,
rejection prevailed even for Abadeen and Wahid: living in
the more open context of Delhi makes the right hand of
the state all the heavier in IAK.
B. An impossible citizenship
This last section examines how deeply the rejection of the
Indian citizenship is felt among KMs19. ‘Felt’ has a double
meaning: KMs feel rejection by the state, along with a
strong disaffiliation from their side. However, disaffiliation
is mostly phrased as a result of non-KM Delhite society’s
behavior, especially regarding KM’s supposed ‘disloyalty.’
Hifza (twenty-one, student) said: “Even if we wanted to
feel Indian, they don’t trust us”. She clearly considered
the state responsible for this dynamic of disaffiliation:
“The Indian state never lets me feel [Indian citizen]”. In
the same way, asked whether they consider themselves
Indian citizens, not a single informant gave a positive
answer. I met Faali (twenty-seven, journalist) at his home
in New Delhi, where he was stopping between two stays
in IAK. His manner was determined when he stressed
the violence exerted on KMs: “Even if [the Indian State]
says that Kashmir is a part of India, they don’t treat us as
Indian citizens. I can’t feel as if I belong to this country”.
Summarizing the relationship to both Indian society
and state, Abadeen (twenty-eight, journalist) ended her
interview by stating that: “It’s difficult to even think
that you are a part of them, it’s just difficult to say we
are one people”. Informants shared a common metaphor
to express their national disaffiliation: their passport is
a mere administrative document devoid of sentimental
belonging. Going a step further, Wahid (twenty-eight, PhD
student) evoked the forced dimension of his national affiliation: “I don’t consider myself Indian. I am forced to be an
Indian but emotionally and mentally I am not”. Within the
peculiar context of 2016, accounts of informants therefore
showed that living in New Delhi nurtures an acute sense of
national disaffiliation towards India.
Conclusion
This contribution aimed at assessing how living in New
Delhi influences the belongingness of Kashmiri Muslims
to the state. In that respect, we saw that their emotions
and perceptions of the city, i.e. their ‘Delhi experience’,
re-asserted their feeling of ‘being different’ to Indians.
Emotions and perceptions are informed by informants’
past socialization to violence, as well as by the concrete
acts of discrimination that KM face in New Delhi, and how
they reinterpret them. Hence, patterns of national disaffiliation that arouse from the Delhi experience differ from

those prevailing in IAK two reasons. Firstly, in the present
case though, disaffiliation did not occur in the face of the
military presence deployed in IAK. It developed within a
de jure and de facto open context, in relation with a given
territory and its inhabitants. In addition, it grew in a city
which was chosen by informants in order to grasp fruits
from India’s left hand. Secondly, being an ethnic minority
has no impact on this national disaffiliation: whether in
the majority (in IAK) or not (in New Delhi), KMs did not
consider themselves as Indian citizens. It is worth noting,
in that respect, that a growing share of young KMs join the
insurgency after having lived in ‘India’ (Tikoo Singh 2018).
In the immediate context of 2016, the othering dynamic
was heightened by the reactions of non-KM Delhite
society. This being established, the methodological driver
based on the study of emotions and perceptions shed
a light on informants’ agency in that process: othering
drives KMs away from non-KM Delhite society, and it from
them, albeit to a lesser extent.
New Delhi is never worded as ‘home’. This does not
prevent informants from feeling a certain ambivalence
to the city that, to some extent, remains a political and
institutional resource to exploit. In addition, reading
between the lines in interviews, we can see that non-KM
Delhite society is actually not entirely perceived as
hostile. Still, non-belonging prevails, these ambivalences
showing how complex and labile a process (non-)belonging
is. Ultimately, non-belonging to the city is equated to
national disaffiliation (with certain ambivalences as well).
Documenting the micro (city) level thereby informed us
about the macro (state) level.
National disaffiliation is established as being a two-way
process as far as the agonistic relationship of power is
concerned. In our case, the intransigent repression of
the central state against demonstrators in IAK during
the summer of 2016 further polarized Kashmiri Muslims
against the Indian state. A ray of hope remains in considering that, conversely, a smoother and more inclusive
power over IAK could soften the feeling of national
disaffiliation of Kashmiri Muslims. Unfortunately, since
2016, Modi’s government has not seemed to aim for a more
peaceful relation to the state.
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Endnotes
1. The first version of this contribution was penned
before the scrapping of Art. 370 on the 05 August 2019. To
respect the times of fieldwork and writing, I chose not to
integrate this dimension in the conceptual frame of this
contribution.

5. I unfortunately do not follow Yuval-Davis’s incitation to
adopt an intersectional approach of belongingness. In the
present study, the complex interplay between ethnicity,
caste, and gender will not be thoroughly examined, since
only ethnicity will be studied. This is one limit of this
contribution that will have to be addressed in the future.
6. In 1948, in the aftermath of first Indo-Pakistani war,
Resolution 47 of the United Nations Security Council
recommended holding a self-determination plebiscite.
Two options were to be proposed to Kashmiri people from
both sides of the border: either merging with Pakistan or
merging with India. Independence was never an option,
and the plebiscite never took place.
7. The accession of the erstwhile princely state of J&K
to the Republic of India was legally codified by the
Instrument of Accession, 26 October 1947.
8. For a subtle approach of the role of the KMs themselves
in this process, see Hafsa Kanjwal (Kanjwal 2018).
9. Pakistan also plays an important role in the insurgency,
having offered ideological as well as logistical support to
the insurgents from IAK. Nevertheless, the role of Pakistan
in the insurgency is not documented as indicated in the
body of the article.
10. Census 2011 reported that 25.6% of the population is
aged between the ages of zero and fourteen. This figure
indicates the large share of IAK’s population that was born
after 1990 and whose sole experience of the Indian state is
violent (Census 2011).
11. Names were changed for security.

2. This contribution aims at exploring Indian Kashmiris’
belongingness towards India. For that reason, I
intentionally restricted my state of the literature to the
legal national territory at stake. Despite some claims of a
‘Kashmiri nationalism’ encompassing Pakistan and Indian
Kashmiris alike, I consider that national borders do matter
to understand belonging dynamics. Scholar Nasreen Ali
does the same in denying a ‘Kashmiri identity’ in her
analysis of Kashmiri Muslims (Ali 2009).

12. Events are referred to in their Foucaldian approach
(Revel 2004: 30-32).

3. That is not to say that KM are a homogenous group.
They are of different sects, social classes, professional
milieus, and/or political affiliations, but the vast majority
share a ‘political fate’ while living under the same
conditions. In addition, IAK is also populated by a small
share of Sikhs and Christians who are not considered
here.

15. Another attack took place, targeting the military camp
of Uri, IAK, in September 2016, just after I reached India.
We can assume that this attack also had a strong impact
on New Delhi’s inhabitants’ perception of KMs. Since this
event was not mentioned by the KM themselves however, I
do not elaborate upon it.

4. See the very stimulating chapter by Saiba Varma:
“From ‘Terrorist’ to ‘Terrorized’: How Trauma Became the
Language of Suffering in Kashmir” (Duchinksi et al. 2018).
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13. The word “lull” was used by all informants to describe
calm periods.
14. Besides violence, authorities used curfew, arrests of
activists, closure of newspaper, suspension of Internet, and
collective punishment.

16. They sometimes expressed mixed feelings towards
IAK as well, but addressing these ambivalences is not the
purpose of this article.

17. For more information on this occurrence, see the
article of the Economic Times (Press Trust of India 2016b).
18. The situation seems different for Indian Muslims
(Gayer 2012) and for Northeasterners (McDuie-Ra 2013).
19. The purpose here is to assess the non-belonging of
KMs. For this reason, positive dimensions of belonging to
IAK are not mentioned, at the expense of the expression
of national disaffiliation. Nevertheless, potential further
studies must bear in mind that assertion of the two often
went hand-in-hand during interviews.

References
Aggarwal, Neil. 2008. “Kashmiriyat as Empty Signifier”.
Interventions 10(2): 222-235.
Ahmed, Sara. 2004. The Cultural Politics of Emotions.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Alam, Arshad. 2008. “The Enemy Within: Madrasa and
Muslim Identity in North India”. Modern Asian Studies
42(2/3): 605-627.
Ali, Nasreen. 2009. “The Making of Kashmiri Identity”.
South Asian Diaspora 1(2): 181-192.
Appadurai, Arjun. 2009. Géographie de la colère : la violence à
l’âge de la globalisation. Paris: Payot.
Behera, Navnita Chadha. 2006. Demystifying Kashmir.
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
. 2000. State, Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and
Ladakh. Delhi: Manohar.
Bell, Vikki. 1999. “Performativity and Belonging: an
Introduction”. Theory, Culture & Society 16(2): 1-10.
Bhat, Gh. Rasool. 2012. “The exodus of Kashmiri pandits
and its impact (1989–2002)”. International Journal of Research
in Social Sciences & Humanities 2(2): 103-116.
Bhatt, Anil. 2017. “Militancy in Kashmir: 70 Youths Joined
Terrorist Groups in 2017 so far, Says Official”. The Quint, 13
August.
Blom Hansen, Thomas. 2000. Predicaments of Secularism:
Muslim Identities and Politics in Mumbai. Journal of the
Royal Anthropological Institute 6(2):255-272.
Blom Hansen, Thomas and Finn Stepputat, editors.
2001. States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the
Postcolonial State. Durham: Duke University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1993. La misère du monde. Paris: Seuil.
Bouzas, Antia Mato. 2016. “The Kashmir Space: Bordering
and Belonging Across the Line of Control”. Revista
Electronica de Estudios Internacionales 31: 2-23.
Chandra Pal, Khagendra.1953. “The Relation Between the
Indian Union and the State of Jammu and Kashmir”. The
Indian Journal of Political Science 14(4): 333-346.
Chowdhary, Rekha. 2016. Jammu and Kashmir: Politics of
Identity and Separatism. New Delhi: Routledge.
Cottrell, Jill. 2013. “Kashmir: The Vanishing Autonomy”. In
Practising Self-Government: A Comparative Study of Autonomous
Regions, edited by Yash Ghai and Sophia Woodman, 163199. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dabla, Bashir Ahmad. 2011. Social Impact of Militancy in
Kashmir. New Delhi: Gyan.
Datta, Ankur. 2016. On Uncertain Ground: A Study of Displaced
Kashmiri Pandits in Jammu and Kashmir. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Devadas, David. 2018. The Generation of Rage in Kashmir.
Oxford: University Press.
Duschinski, Haley. 2008. “‘Survival is Now our Politics’:
Kashmiri Hindu Community Identity and the Politics of
Homeland”. International Journal of Hindu Studies 12(1): 4164.
Duschinski Haley, Mona Bhan, Ather Zia, and Cynthia
Mahmood, editors. 2018. Resisting Occupation in Kashmir.
Philadelphia: Pennsylvania Press.
Duchinski, Haley and Shrimoyee Nandini Ghosh. 2017.
“Constituting the Occupation: Preventive Detention and
Permanent Emergency in Kashmir”. The Journal of Legal
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 49(3): 314-337.
Ellis, Patricia and Zafar Khan. 2003. “Kashmiri
Displacement and the Impact on Kashmiriyat”.
Contemporary South Asia 12(4): 523-538.
Eisenlohr, Patrick. 2006. Little India: Diaspora, Time, and
Ethnolinguistic Belonging in Hindu Mauritius. Oakland:
University of California Press.
Engineer, Asghar Ali. 2008. Muslim Minority: Continuity and
Change. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House.
Evans, Alexander. 2002. “A Departure from History: Kashmiri
Pandits, 1990-2001”. Contemporary South Asia 11(1): 19-37.
Flam, Helena and Jochen Kleres, editors. 2015. Methods of
Exploring Emotions. Abingdon: Routledge.

HIMALAYA Volume 40, Number 1 | 75

Fortier, Anne-Marie. 2000. Migrant Belongings: Memory,
Space, Identity. London: Bloomsbury.

Malik, Inshah. 2019. Muslim Women, Agency and Resistance
Politics: The Case of Kashmir. London: Palgrave.

Foucault, Michel. 1994. “Texte n° 306 : Le sujet et le
pouvoir”. In Dits et écrits: tome IV (1980-1988), 233-238. Paris:
Gallimard.

Mankekar, Purnima. 2002. “‘India Shopping’: Indian
Grocery Stores and Transnational Configurations of
Belonging”. Ethnos 67(1): 75-79.

Ganguly, Sumit. 2016. Deadly Impasse: Kashmir and IndoPakistani Relations at the Dawn of New Century. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Martin, Denis-Constant, editor. 2010. L’identité en jeux :
Pouvoirs, identifications, mobilisations. Paris: Karthala.

Gayer, Laurent. 2012. “Safe and Sound: Searching for
a ‘Good Environment’” In Abul Fazal Enclave, Delhi. In
Muslims in Indian Cities: Trajectories of Marginalisation, edited
by Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot. London: Hurst &
Co.
Hasan, Mushirul. 2008a. Moderate or Militant: Images of India’s
Muslims. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
. 2008b, editor. Living with Secularism: the Destinity of
India’s Muslims. New Delhi: Manohar.
Hassan, Khalid Wassim. 2018. “From Administration to
Occupation: the Re-Production and Subversion of Public
Spaces in Kashmir”. Third World Quaterly (3)2: 212-227.

Mathur, Shubh. 2016. The Human Toll of the Kashmir Conflict:
Grief and Courage in a South Asian Borderland. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan US.
. 2013. “The Perfect Enemy: Maps, Laws and Sacrifice
in the Making of Borders”. Critique of Anthropology 33(4):
429-446.
McDuie-Ra, Duncan. 2013. “Beyond the ‘Exclusionary City’:
North-east Migrants in Neo-liberal Delhi”. Urban Studies
50(8): 1625-1640.
Mehta, Neha Tara. 2016. “Kashmir: Why Are Young People
Protesting?” Al Jazeera, 17 July.

Jairath, Vinod K, editor. 2011. Frontiers of Embedded Muslim
Communities in India. New Delhi: Routledge India.

Menon, Ajit and Manasi Karthik. 2019. “Genealogies and
Politics of Belonging: People, Nature and Conservation in
the Nilgiri Hills of Tamil Nadu”. Conservation & Society 17(2):
195-203.

Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS). 2016.
Annual Human Rights Review. Jammu Kashmir Coalition of
Civil Society.

Merrill, Christi A. 2009. Riddles of Belonging: India in
Translation and Other Tales of Possession. New York: Fordham
University Press.

Kanjwal, Hafsa. 2018. “Reflections on the PostPartition Period: Life Narratives of Kashmiri Muslims in
Contemporary Kashmir”. HIMALAYA (38)2: 40-60.

Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. 2011.
Census. <https://censusindia.gov.in/vital_statistics/SRS_
Report/9Chap%202%20-%202011.pdf>.

Kirmani, Nida. 2013. Questioning “the Muslim Woman”:
Identity and Insecurity in an Urban Indian Locality. London:
Routledge.

Naqash, Rayan. 2018. “‘It Sells to Bash Kashmiris’: How
National TV Channels Have Deepened Resentment in the
Valley”. Scroll.in, 19 January.

. 2008. “Constructing ‘the Other’: Narrating Religious
Boundaries in Zakir Nagar”. Contemporary South Asia 16(4):
397-412.

Press Trust of India. 2016a. “Aligarh Muslim University
expels Kashmiri student over ‘objectionable’ post on Uri
attack”. The Indian Express, 19 September.

Kumar, Ashwarya. 2017. “Equal Citizens of India? Kashmiri
Students Recount Threats and Attacks”. News18, 24 April.

. 2016b. “Kashmiri Students ‘Silent’ Sufferers in Afzal
Guru Row at JNU”. Economic Times, 21 February.
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